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GENERAL ETHICS
Facial allograft transplantation, personal identity and
subjectivity
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An analysis of the identity issues involved in facial allograft
transplantation is provided in this paper. The identity issues
involved in organ transplantation in general, under both
theoretical accounts of personal identity and subjective accounts
provided by organ recipients, are examined. It is argued that
the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation are
similar to those involved in organ transplantation in general, but
much stronger because the face is so closely linked with
personal identity. Recipients of facial allograft transplantation
have the potential to feel that their identity is a mix between their
own and the donor’s, and the donor’s family is potentially likely
to feel that their loved one ‘‘lives on’’. It is also argued that facial
allograft transplantation allows the recipients to regain an
identity, because they can now be seen in the social world.
Moreover, they may regain expressivity, allowing for them to be
seen even more by others, and to regain an identity to an even
greater extent. Informing both recipients and donors about the
role that identity plays in facial allograft transplantation could
enhance the consent process for facial allograft transplantation
and donation.
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I
n the fall 2004 issue of the American Journal of
Bioethics, several articles focused on the ethical
issues involved in facial allograft transplanta-
tion. The main issues addressed were the appro-
priateness of offering such a high-risk procedure
for a non-life-threatening condition, whether or
not patients could truly consent to such a
procedure, privacy issues, the ethical climate of
the institution where the transplant is to be
performed and the social effects of the availability
of facial allograft transplantation. Several articles
called for an analysis of the identity issues
involved in facial allograft transplantation.1–3 This
paper provides such an analysis.
There is a pressing need for an examination of
the identity issues involved for two reasons. First,
the identity issues are closely linked with the
ethical issues. In fact, part of the Royal College of
Surgeons of England’s rejection of facial allograft
transplantation was because the issues associated
with facial identity present a significant ethical
impediment.4 Concerns about the face and identity
were also part of the reason for The French
National Ethics Consultation Committee’s opinion
that facial allograft transplantation is not an ideal
solution for the problem of facial disfigurement.
There were two main concerns with the identity
issues. They worried that the recipient would not
identify with the transplant and not view it as their
own, and it would be rejected or removed, as was the
case with the first hand transplant recipient. They
also worried that the recipient would not regain
physical expressivity from the facial graft, and so the
ability of a facial allograft transplant to allow the
recipient to once again express her identity through
facial expression (eg, blinking, smiling and frown-
ing) would not probably be regained.5 Moreover, the
identity issues are important to the ethical issues
because informing both recipients and donors about
the role that identity plays in facial allograft
transplantation may enhance the consent process.
The other reason is because the first partial human
facial allograft transplant occurred in France only in
December 2005 and the first full human facial
allograft transplant will most probably occur in the
near future.
Before moving to the analysis, it will be useful to
make a note of what types of facial allograft
transplant I am referring to, and to make a note of
the language that I am using. I use the term ‘‘facial
allograft transplantation’’ as opposed to ‘‘facial
transplantation’’ or ‘‘composite tissue allotrans-
plantation’’. The French National Ethics
Consultation Committee uses the term ‘‘composite
tissue allotransplantation’’, arguing that the term
facial transplantation is inaccurate: ‘‘The expres-
sion ‘facial graft’ should be discouraged. It is never
a face that is grafted, but composite tissue. A tissue
is not a face, but the object is to provide
morphology that will again be akin to a human
face’’ (p 20). George Agich and Maria Siemionow6
also discourage the term facial transplantation,
preferring the more clinically accurate term ‘‘facial
allograft transplantation’’. Additionally, facial allo-
graft transplants involve transplanting consider-
able amounts of skin, muscle and sometimes
bone.5 Lastly, this paper refers to both partial and
full facial allograft transplants, and I argue that
the closer the transplant is to a full facial allograft
transplant, the deeper the identity issues will be.
PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION
To explore the identity issues involved in facial
allograft transplantation, it is helpful to first
explore the identity issues involved in organ
transplantation. There are two ways to approach
how organ transplantation affects personal iden-
tity. One way is to examine the issue under
different theories of personal identity and the
other is to examine the first-person experiences of
organ recipients with regard to identity.
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The psychological account of personal identity and
organ transplantation
The psychological account of personal identity holds that what
makes me me is my psychological make-up or my ‘‘mind’’—that
is, I am essentially my memories, beliefs, desires and so on.7 On
the psychological view, once my psychological life ceases to
exist, so do I. My body and my organs remain, as do my house,
my car and my cat. These are all things that I used to own and
they will be handled in accordance with my wishes when I
cease to exist.
The lived-body account of personal identity and organ
transplantation
Developed by phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the
lived-body account of personal identity seeks to remove the
mind/body dualism found in the psychological account. On the
lived-body view, personal identity is not just the mind. A
conscious being is the integration of mind and body. We are
living bodies, or embodied selves. Merleau-Ponty8 points to the
phantom limb as evidence for the lived-body idea: if the body
were just a machine for the mind, then when one loses a limb
one would just go on operating the machine without that part.
But this does not happen; the person who loses a limb still feels
the limb and still attempts to use the limb, even though it is no
longer there. Merleau-Ponty further describes the idea of the
lived body by pointing out that (in normal experience) it is not
that ‘‘I’’ observe or move my body; I am my body. Describing
the experience of movement, he comments that one does not
have to find one’s body and figure out how to move it, one
simply moves it (p 108).
On the lived-body account of personal identity, the body is a
central part of identity. The body is not some object or house for
the mind; it is part of the self. Hence, giving away an organ is
like giving away a part of the self. In fact, organ recipients often
describe the feeling of having someone else inside of them. The
subjective experiences of organ recipients relate more closely to
the lived-body account of identity than the psychological
account. Organ recipients do not just feel that they have
something that once belonged to someone else, they feel that
they have part of someone else inside of them.
First-person experience, personal identity and organ
transplantation
With regard to personal identity, looking at the subjective
experiences of transplant recipients is important because self-
experience is an important ingredient of self-identity. Margaret
Lock9, an anthropologist, has recounted some of the experi-
ences of organ recipients. She argues, ‘‘It is abundantly clear
that donated organs very often represent much more than mere
biological body parts; the life with which they are animated is
experienced by recipients as personified, an agency that
manifests itself in some surprising ways, and profoundly
influences subjectivity’’. Lock cites the finding that recipients
often worry about the gender, ethnicity, skin colour, personality
and social status of the donor. Many recipients believe that
their mode of being in the world will be radically changed (p
1410). One liver and kidney recipient had the following to say:
‘‘I still think of it as a different person inside of me—yes I do,
still. It’s not all of me, and it’s not all this person either …. You
know, I never liked cheese and stuff like that, and some people
think I’m joking, but all of a sudden I couldn’t stop eating Kraft
slices—that was after the first kidney. This time around, the
first thing I did was to eat chocolate. I have a craving for
chocolate now and I eat some every day. It’s driving me crazy
because I’m not a chocolate fanatic. So maybe this person who
gave me the liver was a chocoholic?’’ (p 1411). This recipient
also said, ‘‘You know, sometimes I feel as if I’m pregnant, as if
I’m giving birth to somebody. I don’t know what it is really, but
there’s another life inside of me, and I’m actually storing this
life …’’ (p 1411).
Consistent with this recipient’s experience, Lock reports, ‘‘…
many recipients undergo a profound change in subjectivity and
report that they experience embodiment in a radically different
way after a transplant’’ (p 1411). Lock describes an interesting
conversation that she had with a transplant surgeon who was
against allowing prisoners to donate organs. When asked why,
he replied, ‘‘I wouldn’t like to have a murderer’s heart put into
my body, I might find myself starting to change’’ (p 1410).
Another person who has produced interesting work on the
first-person experiences of organ recipients is anthropologist
Lesley Sharp. Sharp10 found that most recipients she inter-
viewed expressed a sense of having been reborn. She also found
that recipients often feel that they have acquired the donor’s
emotional, moral or physical characteristics (p 372).
Interestingly, the symbolic weight of the organ had a profound
effect on the transformation of identity (p 372). For example,
heart recipients experienced a greater transformation of
identity than kidney recipients (p 372).
Reporting on the first-person experience of donor families,
Sharp found that relatives often think that their loved one can
‘‘live on’’ in another body and that the recipient is an extension
of the donor’s biography (pp 364, 380). This finding relates
closely to a view of identity in which the donor is not just giving
the recipient a body part, he is also giving the recipient part of
his identity. Sharp argues, ‘‘In the realm of transplantation,
selfhood is similarly and intensely corporeal’’ (p 377).
PERSONAL IDENTITY AND FACIAL ALLOGRAFT
TRANSPLANTATION
One may be tempted to say that the identity issues involved in
facial allograft transplantation are no different from the
identity issues involved in organ transplantation in general.
Arguing against this, I pose that there are unique identity issues
involved in facial allograft transplantation, beginning with the
significance of the face for personal identity.
The face and personal identity
The face is enormously important in defining personal
identity.11 The team of transplant surgeons at University of
Louisville who have been considering performing a facial
allograft transplant acknowledged this when they said, ‘‘…
the appearance of our face is the predominant anatomical
feature by which we identify and differentiate ourselves from
others’’.12 The face not only expresses appearance, it also
expresses feeling. John Robertson, a commentator on the
Louisville team’s article on the ethics of facial transplantation,
remarked, ‘‘Faces are the external manifestation of our persons
(our souls?). They provide information about age, gender,
ethnicity, and emotional states, and help form the image that
others have of us. Indeed, our face often provides the image
that we have of ourselves’’.2 ‘‘… the face is a window to our
inner selves—it represents the entire personality and is the
focus of attention in every social interaction’’.13
Nichola Rumsey,14 another commentator on the ethics of
facial transplantation, remarked, ‘‘Our faces help us under-
stand who we are and where we come from, with indicators of
our genetic inheritance, ancestry, and racial identity. Wrinkles
and marks serve as reminders of each individual life history’’.
Radana Konigova and Ivo Pondelicek,15 who studied the
psychological aspects of facial burns, remark, ‘‘To quote
Mortimer: ‘without their faces, humans would hardly be
human at all’. In this connection, we are interested in whether
people suffering from facial deformation, ‘loss of face’ due to
burns, can also lose their personalities … It is well known that
the face is the representative of the entire personality for three
reasons: it is the most complex area of the whole body schema
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and has its own social principle, aesthetic representation is
concentrated in the face, and the face makes the absolutely
essential inter-personal communication possible’’.
Facial allograft transplantation and personal identity
Because of its close association with personal identity, the face
is different from other transplantable organs. The Royal
College’s report on facial transplantation claims that ‘‘The face
is central to our understanding of our own identity. Faces help
us understand who we are and where we come from.’’ 4
Francoise Baylis1 notes that, ‘‘For these reasons, the face is
not fungible in the way that other human organs and tissues
used for transplant might be’’.
With regard to facial allograft transplantation, the identity
issues involved are both stronger and more unique than the
identity issues involved in general organ transplantation. For
example, in organ transplantation the donor’s family often feels
as if their loved one lives on in the recipient. I pose that this
feeling would be much stronger in the case of facial allograft
transplantation. This is because a facial allograft transplant is
externally visible and implicates continuation of the deceased
person in a way that internal organs do not.2 The first-person
experiences of recipients taking on part of the donor’s identity
will probably be even stronger in the case of facial allograft
transplantation. Nichola Rumsey3 noted that in common forms
of organ transplantation there is difficulty integrating the
transplant into the existing body image and identity. Further,
she predicts that these difficulties will be exacerbated in the
case of facial allograft transplantation. If patients cannot accept
the facial allograft as their own, this will negatively impact the
success of the procedure as they might be less inclined to
participate in physical therapy, for example.
Like externally visible allografts, hand transplants can be
reflected upon to support the prediction that the identity issues
involved in facial allograft transplantation are much stronger
than those involved in general organ transplantation. The first
hand transplant was performed in France in 1998.16 Two hand
transplants were performed simultaneously in China in 1999.
The doctors involved in the 1999 operation studied the
psychological consequences of the transplant. They report that
after the surgery the two recipients were ‘‘… horrified over
seeing the long expected hand graft’’.17 The patients were
unwilling to accept the hand immediately. They seldom looked
at it, seemed indifferent to it and even turned their head to the
other side while sleeping (p 1661). The doctors report that after
about 1 month, there was recovery of active movement of the
hand and at this point the recipients fully accepted the hand (p
1661). After 4–5 months, sensation was regained and the
recipients regarded the hand as their own (p 1661).
The experiences of hand transplants are much different from
those of other organ transplantations because, as Lijun et al17
state, ‘‘Unlike other organ transplantations the recipients of
limb transplants must look upon and direct the transplanted
hand to exert its function’’ (p 1660). The hand represents
personal identity in a way that other organs do not. ‘‘It is
indeed unsettling to think that the hand with which one has
once been intimate may now stroke another body’’.18 Like the
hand, the face is a uniquely external structure that is visible to
the recipient. This said, the psychological consequences of facial
allograft transplantation will be different from those of other
organ transplants, as will the effects on personal identity.
Because the face is external and so closely related to identity,
the effects of facial allograft transplantation on personal
identity will be much stronger than those of solid organ
transplants. More specifically, the recipient’s experiences of
taking on part of the donor’s identity will probably be stronger,
as will the donor families’ experiences that their loved one lives
on.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FACIAL ALLOGRAFT
TRANSPLANTATION AND FACIAL DISFIGUREMENT
One might grant that the face plays a significant role in personal
identity, but argue that the identity issues experienced by a
recipient of a face transplant are no different from those
experienced when that person initially underwent facial disfig-
urement. Although many identity issues are the same between
becoming disfigured and receiving a facial allograft transplant,
there are significant differences. One significant difference is that
in the case of facial allograft transplantation, change in identity is
desired, but in the case of severe facial disfigurement, changes in
identity are often unanticipated and always unwanted. This is not
to say that in the case of facial disfigurement the person could not
accept his or her change in identity. But certainly the change in
identity is not a wanted one.
Another significant difference is that in the case of facial
allograft transplantation, the person is gaining an identity,
whereas in the case of severe facial disfigurement, the person is
losing an identity. The patient seeking a facial allograft
transplant has been described as gaining a face, or an identity.
Joe Demarco19, a bioethics professor at Cleveland State
University said, ‘‘We need to keep in mind that this is a
terrible thing not to have a face, so the benefits are potentially
great—not only to medical science, but also to the individual
patient.’’ Dr John Barker,20 a surgeon at University of Louisville,
Louisville, Kentucky, USA, who has been preparing for the
procedure remarked, ‘‘The human face is you. Take that away—
could it benefit you to give you a face back?’’. Even those who
are hesitant about the procedure describe it in terms of gaining
a face. Noting the rejection risks, they conclude ‘‘… we
welcome further analysis and debate not least so that, in the
drive to gain face, we do not overlook the risks of losing face’’.21
Dr Maria Siemionow,22 a Cleveland Clinic plastic surgeon, has
also spoken of the severely disfigured recipient as ‘‘having no
face’’ and ‘‘having no identity’’. In this sense, the transplant
would give the recipient a face, and give her an identity. But,
Siemionow is quick to point out that the procedure is not an
identity transfer. The procedure is not transferring one person’s
identity to another because what is really being transferred is
just a ‘‘skin fold’’. Siemionow’s view, then, regards the recipient
as gaining a face and even gaining an identity, but it is a new
face and a new identity; not the face and identity of the donor.
A quote by John Robertson,23 a commentator on the ethics of
facial allograft transplantation, expresses a similar view.
Robertson argues, ‘‘The previously disfigured recipient is likely
to welcome the new physical identity that the transplanted face
brings . It is precisely the new face and associated physical
identity that the recipient craves, even if internally he or she
remains the same individual’’. Again, this view poses that the
recipient is gaining a (physical) identity.
The point about the transplant recipient gaining an identity is
an interesting one that deserves further development. The
recipient is now granted an identity that he or she was previously
denied, and this is important because one’s identity is very much
constructed by others. Two important ways in which the recipient
gains an identity are that the recipient (1) is now recognised by
others and gains an identity in the social world and (2) may gain
the ability of expressivity, which allows the recipient to express
himself or herself and receive identity-constructing responses
from others, and also expressivity itself allows one to fully feel
emotions and develop a more robust sense of self.
Philosopher and phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty24
said, ‘‘I live in the facial expression of the other, as I feel him
living in mine …’’. Donna Williams, who has written of her
experiences as an autistic person who is unable to express
herself emotionally, reacts to Merleau-Ponty’s quote by
explaining that what told her that she did exist was seeing in
Facial transplantation, personal identity and phenomenology 451
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someone else’s eyes that they had seen her.25 She also notes
that the presence of another can be used to learn more about
oneself (p 97).
John Hull, Professor of Religious Education and Dean of the
Faculty of Education and Continuing Studies at the University
of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK, has written of his experience
of losing his sight, and of being no longer able to see faces. He
writes, ‘‘To what extent is the loss of the image of the face
connected with loss of image of the self?’’ (p 29). Dr Hull
believed that once he lost his sight and no longer had the visual
memory of his face or the faces of his family members, that his
self was in jeopardy, for to be seen is to exist (p 183).
The charity ‘‘Changing Faces’’, which was developed in
London by James Partridge, a person with facial disfigurement,
and Nicola Rumsey, a psychologist, expresses the social
construction of identity eloquently, ‘‘We live not ‘in our own
heads’ but exist, and are made whole, in the reflective mirrors
of others’’ (p 173). Changing Faces encourages people with
facial disfigurement to step out into the world. ‘‘Only then can
they be aware of others for their own sake, and be seen as an
individual, a person, and not as a marker of their own social
stigma or limitations. And the way, possibly the only way, to
become reconciled and rebuild a life is to use not the mirror on
the wall but the mirrored perceptions of oneself that others
bring’’ (p 179). The French National Ethics Consultation
Committee5 made a similar remark in their report on facial
allograft transplantation. They note that because we cannot see
our own face, we must rely on artificial mirrors and natural
mirrors (others) to get to know ourselves.
The ability to express oneself, to express one’s feelings and
emotions is also an important aspect of identity. Expressivity is
needed to really be seen by others.Ludwig Wittgenstein26 said, ‘‘The
human body is the best picture of thehuman soul’’. Mary, a woman
who lost face expressivity and muscle control for unknown
reasons, believed that she was reduced to a person, to a ‘‘her’’ in
the eyes of others because she was unable to relate to them through
her face (Cole,25 p 10). James, who developed a condition called
Mobius syndrome that does not allow him to move his facial
muscles and express himself, explains the importance of facial
expressivity for identity: ‘‘I can read faces but I can’t give a face in
return. In that sense I am invisible or blank’’ (p 129).
Expressivity is also needed in order for one to fully feel
emotions and to develop a robust sense of self-identity. Our
emotions are not simply something that occur in our minds,
they depend on embodiment (p 191). Even the French National
Ethics Consultation Committee5 noted that our ability to
express affects our feelings. In describing the case of James,
Jonathan Cole25, author of About face, the fascinating book from
which these cases are drawn, says, ‘‘It was as though the
displaying of emotion on the face enabled its full feeling and
expression within ... Without the ability to show to others, a full
social existence was scarcely possible, and without these
relationships the inner feelings could not develop’’ (p 179).
And certainly, inner feelings are an important part of our
understanding of our own identity.
Thus, whether or not facial allograft transplantation will
allow for an increase in expressivity is important. The French
National Ethics Consultation Committee5 is sceptical of the
ability to regain expressivity. They note the complexity of the
facial nervous system and the multiplicity of small facial
muscles. They note that it is reasonable that some form of
expressive mobility could be regained, but caution that this
depends on the gravity of the existing scarring on the face
before surgery (p 14). They claim that there is little likelihood
for regaining complete mobility of expression (especially with a
full allograft; p 17). Dr Peter Butler, the surgeon responsible for
the first hand transplant, has predicted that the patient will
only regain expressivity after extensive nerve regeneration has
occurred. He warns that at first the transplanted face will
provide a better aesthetic appearance but may actually decrease
function and expressivity.21 In summary, the extent of
expressivity that the transplant recipient will regain is
unknown at this point, as a full facial allograft transplantation
has not been performed, and only two partial transplants have
been performed, with short-term outcome data.
A third significant difference in identity issues between
disfigurement and transplant is that it is during transplant that
the recipient comes to wear the identity of another person—a
dead person. Although the recipient will not ‘‘look like’’ the
donor (because the recipient’s underlying bone and muscle
remain intact), knowing that the skin is from another person
could make a significant impact on the identity issues that arise
for the recipient. Consider two cases: (1) you are hooked up to a
machine that distorts much of your psychological make-up–it
deletes some memories and beliefs and mixes up others; (2)
you are hooked up to a machine that changes your psycholo-
gical make-up equally but it does so by transferring many
memories and beliefs from another person into you. Although
in both cases you have had a significant change in identity, in
the second case part of your new identity is from another
person. Having part of your identity from another person is a
unique identity issue that arises in facial allograft transplanta-
tion, but not in disfigurement.
CONCLUSIONS FOR THE TRANSPLANTATION DEBATE
Through both theoretical and first-person accounts I have
examined the identity issues involved in organ transplantation
in general, and I have argued that the identity issues involved
in facial allograft transplantation are both similar to those
involved in general transplantation and also unique because the
face is so closely linked with personal identity.
Although the face is for most people more closely linked with
identity than other transplantable organs, there is certainly
variation in individual psychologies. There may be a person who
believes that the heart is more closely linked with identity than
the face. There are certainly organ recipients who do not have the
subjective experience of someone living on inside them, and
certainly not everyone who receives a face transplant will have
the subjective experience of their identity consisting partly of
another person. With this variation noted, it seems arbitrary to
claim that the identity issues involved in facial allograft
transplantation render it unethical, whereas the identity issues
involved in other types of organ transplantation do not.
Thus, a conclusion that can be drawn from the transplanta-
tion debate (with respect to the identity issues) is not that facial
allograft transplantation is unethical, but that for it to be
ethical, the informed consent process for the transplant should
inform potential recipients of the identity issues involved. Of
course, further exploration of the connection between personal
identity and ethics in facial allograft transplantation is needed
and this could be performed through empirical studies of those
receiving facial allograft transplants.
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